| Alexander Moseley's Philosophy of War Pages |
Baron de Montesquieu
This is a brief sketch outlined for a now aborted collection of writings (no one was interested before Sept 11th 2001 but I have since reviewed others' attempts at compiling the classics in just war theory). This was written in 1998 before I gave up hope of finding a publisher for the collection, which still sits on my shelves, and moved onto other projects. (Sept 2004) |
Baron de Montesquieu (Charles-Louis de Secondat) was born near Bordeaux in 1689. A profligate with money he married into wealth but moved to live alone in Paris. He was highly influenced by Locke and the ideas of toleration, moderation, freedom, and constitutional government. In turn he influenced many thinkers such as Edmund Burke and Émile Durkheim, as well as indirectly influencing the tone of political developments in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Although he wrote very much in the traditional natural law strain, he placed greater emphasis on the empirical element of his researches into laws, accordingly he believed that more important than a priori laws are the particulars of each situation. Liberty, he believed, ought not to be an abstract concept but concrete, which is to be adapted to local circumstances. He also acknowledged what later became the utilitarian position, that the law should aim for the common good, hence liberty ought not to be absolute but contingent. He died in 1755. Montesquieu begins with the premise
that governments rights are analogous to individual rights. Governments
have the right to protect themselves, and hence possess the right
to wage wars of self-preservation, and individuals have the right
to protect themselves, and hence to right to wage violence against
aggressors. This premise is questionable. The form of an analogy is
A is to B as C is to D, but it is not clear here that Montesquieu
has provided an analogy. To argue that government rights are analogous
to individual rights is to follow the logical criteria that A is to
B as C is to B. What must be asserted in Montesquieu's proposition
is that individuals are to rights as governments are to rights, and
this is not necessarily the case. Firstly, if individuals are said to
possess rights, and that they possess them independently of any structure
of authority, then it is a very difficult task to prove how natural
and inalienable rights of individuals can also be held by institutions.
Institutions are conglomerations of individuals who act together by
abiding by rules. From a natural rights position, it can be argued
that institutions or collectives are given rights by the individuals
comprising them or who are affected by them, but that implies that
if these people no longer desire the existence of the institution,
they can remove those rights. From which it follows that any rights
accorded to governments are better termed 'privileges'. Secondly, it can be argued that individuals
get their rights from government. In which case their rights are better
termed 'privileges', but this begs the question of the source of rights.
How can governments be alloters of rights? A hidden premise is that
rights are subject to legislator's considerations, and are not then
independent of authority. And this would be also true of the government's
rights to exist. A different legislative power can change the rights
of individuals and of the government, weakening or strengthening either. From these two considerations it follows
that rights are merely held as privileges by the government or by
the people. And if the existence of an individual is merely a privilege,
it must also follow that the right of defence is similarly a privilege.
If it is accepted by the common authority that individuals possess
a privilege to defend themselves, it is implicit that the privilege
may be withdrawn; and if the privileges of government are analogous
to those of individuals, likewise the privilege of government to defend
itself may be withdrawn. If, on the other hand, Montesqiueu
is interested in rights and not privileges, we return to the first
problem of making a logical jump from individual rights to governmental
rights. If individuals possess inalienable rights then they should
not conflict, for demands of consistency, in themselves and with any
rights the government possesses. For instance, an individual cannot
be said to possess (1) the right to live and (2) the right to the
time and labour of others, for (1) is inconsistent with (2). And a
government cannot be said to possess a right to restrict speech if
individuals are said to possess the right of expression. If government
rights are analogous to individual rights then it follows that the
rights of governments should not conflict with the rights of individuals.
The demand of consistency provokes
two valid positions that may be held indepedently of one another.
Either (a) governments possess rights, or (b) individuals possess
rights. It cannot be true that (a) and (b), for inconsistencies arise.
It follows from this analysis that if governments possess rights then
individuals possess privileges, or if individuals possess rights then
governments possess privileges. Privileges may contradict or circumscribe
rights, for they are necessary for the functioning of either governmental
or individual life. Montesquieu's first premise is thus invalid. Governments
do not possess rights analogous to individual rights: either one but
not the other can possess rights. Montesquieu's mistake is in anthropomorphizing
government. Government is not a single individual, it is an institution
of laws and bodies that are personelled by individuals; it does not
possess a single mind, and it is the product of many minds. By assuming
it possesses the status of individual, Montesquieu's position is unsound.
Given this consideration, we can continue with analyzing Montesquieu's
thoughts on war. The next argument is that the right
governments possess of defence can be extended to include preventative
wars. His theory permits aggressive warfare then, but only in the
case of extended self-defense. This principle permits a felxibility
for a nation to strike first if it believes it will be attacked, rather
than, as in defencist theories, waiting for a border incursion before
obtaining the right to engage the enemy. However, Montesquieu he believes
that the right to preemptive strikes merges into a convincing just
cause for aggressive wars for smaller nations who are ever in the
shadow of larger, more powerful ones: "petty states have oftener
a right to declare war than great ones, because they are oftener in
the case of being afraid of destruction." (p.144) This argument
opens up the conditions justifying war beyond that which is part of
the just war traditions. Most theorists deride the fear of a
larger opponent as a condition for declaring war, for such balance
of power arguments are usually pretexts for other goals -imperialism,
crusading, colonization, and so on. And these goals can never be justified.
Montesquieu inserts
a premise supporting the balance of power theory, namely that merely
the fear a small nation has of a neighbour can justify war. No doubt
this is connected with his empirical thinking, that should smaller
nations let larger nations' military growth go unchecked, they run
the risk of being in a worse off position in the long run if the stronger
neighbour invades. Mainstream just war theory demands that the fear
of an anticipated invasion is connected to concrete evidence of the
military intent of a nation to use its strength as a condition for
a pre-emptive strike, a condition Montesquieu would probably agree
to. For Montesquieu, the right of war follows
from necessity and strict justice. If these two principles are not
heeded then chaos reigns and war becomes glorified. These are sound
premises, which demand adherence to the rules of just war; they oppose
superficial justifications of war on the grounds of national honour
and the imperialist wishes of princes. Once a war is begun the government
has a right to conquer the aggressor nation. The right of conquest
is deemed by Montesquieu as a corollary to the justification and right
to go to war. The right is derived firstly from the law of nature
which justifies preserving the species, and secondly from the law
of natural reason, which is epitomized in the duty to do unto others
as you would have them do unto you, and thirdly from the nature of
war itself, for war carries with it the spirit of preserving rather
than destruction. Each premise can be critically considered. Firstly, it does not necessarily follow
that the right of preservation entails the right of conquest. The
two are separable issues. The right of preservation condones acts
conducive to preserving and this may entail disarming an aggressor's
ability to attack by conquering, but the act of conquering may also
make a nation vulnerable to further attacks, hence in the long run
(along consequentialist reasoning) conquering may be counter-productive. Secondly, Montesquieu asserts that
the principle of conquering is derived from the universalist principles
of doing unto others as you would have them do unto you. This is logically
possible, but then so is anything if no standard of what is ethical
is presumed. Killing others is logically universalizable, and so is
lying, but they are usually considered evil because of an underlying
desire to preserve social cooperation or acts of benevolence between
people. Conquering can be coherently universalizable into the form
-we will conquer them who in turn will conquer us, and vice verse,
but that principle, self-evidentially, is not conducive to peace.
For it to be conducive to peace another standard is required; for
example, an action is moral and universalizable if it benefits the
society, or is conducive to social cooperation, or upholds the rights
of individuals, and so on. The third justification of conquering
that Montesquieu wields is that derived from the nature of war itself.
War aims to preserve not to destroy, from which it follows, according
to Montesquieu, that governments have the right to conquer their foes.
This reasoning is dubious and is falsifiable on empirical grounds.
If conquering another nation does preserve the peace then Montesqueiu's
logic is acceptable, but if, on the other hand, conquering engenders
more wars, then his thesis is false. If the theory is accepted, at
the limit what it implies is a world hegemony of one power which conquers
all other powers in the name of peace. Whether there ought to be a
single world authority is another question, but this conclusion can
be attained from Montesquieu's arguments. All three premises from
which he justifies the right of conquering are in turn questionable.
Traditional just war theory offers a justification to conquer a nation
as a punishment for aggressive acts and as a guarantee against future
aggressions, but the conclusion remains highly debatable, for it conflicts
with other considerations, especially that of the right of self-determination
of a nation and the issue of paternalism in which one group deigns
to choose for another. Montesquieu limits the rights of the
conqueror though (unlike Locke
who theoretically agrees just connquest gives the victor the right
of no quarter).
[1]
The right is not absolute, for once the conquest
is complete the government is no longer necessitated to fight for
self-preservation. The apparatus of the conquered state may justly
be dismantled, but that does not give conquerors the right to kill
the officers of the state. On similar lines, Montesquieu argues that
slavery is permitted during the course of the war but becomes immoral
once the war is over. In these arguments, Montesquieu echoes
much of the just war tradition which precedes him, but then he adds
an interesting twist which anticipates the normative theories of social
darwinists. Social darwinism is the theory that the development of
human societies can be explained by the theories of evolutionary biology.
For example, social darwinists refer to the growth and maturation
of the societal organism as well as its birth and death, and in the
context of war as its subjection to the law of the survival of the
fittest in which only the stronger nations are able to survive the
pressures of evolution. Montesquieu anticipates some of the social
darwinist ideas, for he believes that conquest may be beneficial to
the conquered. A conquered nation, he asserts, is usually a corrupt
and degenerate nation, but: "[a] conquest may destroy pernicious
prejudices." (p.147) This is a very dangerous theory, for it
alludes to a justification of militarism or crusading, in which wars
are fought to conquer other nations whose governments are weak and
corrupt. This permits a carte blanche for international policy, however
Montesquieu tempers this theory to emphasise that conquered peoples
should be left to follow their own laws and practices. (A similar
justification is also found in Bertrand Russell.) Montesquieu's anticipation of social
darwinist thought is derived from his advocacy of the primacy of justice.
A corrupt nation, he believes, deserves a better system. John Stuart
Mill criticised this position, arguing that it is best to leave a
society to define and find its own freedom and justice ("A Few
Words on Non-Intervention" 1873.) The just war doctrine is split
on this point, depending on what premise is taken regarding the nature
of states; if they are tools, whose rights are derived from the people
they govern then intervention is justified to assist a people form
a proper government. A stronger version of this theory permits interventions
to form such institutions whether the people wish them or not. On
the other hand, if governments possess rights independently of people,
either preceding individual rights or attaining greater justification
than individual rights, then intervention is prohibited. Montesquieu's
support of intervention is also inconsistent with his intitial assumption
that governments possess rights; to sustain consistency, intervention
has to be derived from the argument that governments forfeit some
of their rights when they tyrannise their populations. This reasoning
Montesquieu does not draw, but it would strengthen his doctrine. From these considerations we can form
a picture of what Montesquieu's theory of just war is like. The resulting
theory covers the principles of jus
ad bellum only, for he does not extend any analysis to the conduct
of war, and his theory of jus
ad bellum is vague. It is implied that an act of aggression
is sufficient cause for a government to act in defence of itself and
that right of self-preservation extends beyond the defender's political
boundaries and can also be extended to preemptive attacks. Montesquieu
also explicates that smaller nations usually possess a justification
for aggressive warfare against larger, potentially threatening neighbours,
which brings transcends the usual consideration of just war theory
and enters balance of power considerations. However, he is keen to
ensure that justice and necessity are the only sufficient bases for
a claim to just war; but his conception of justice is not apoditic,
which lays him open to the criticism that he is a relativist and that
one nation's justification for war is not another's. Finally his jus
ad bellum criteria become even more questionable with the assumption
that conquering nations can be a good thing. Montesquieu, although a capable and
influential writer, does not provide a cogent theory of just war.
He uses some of the principles of the traditional theory, but mixes
them with empirical adjustments, a result which can either be considered
to be a realistic conception of war or a medley of inconsistencies. |