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Desiderius Erasmus on War
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This is a brief sketch outlined for a now aborted collection of writings (no one was interested before Sept 11th 2001 but I have since reviewed others' attempts at compiling the classics in just war theory). This was written in 1998 before I gave up hope of finding a publisher for the collection, which still sits on my shelves, and moved onto other projects. (Sept 2004)
Erasmus (1466-1536)
was born in Holland, either Rotterdam or Gouda, and died in Basel.
He is famous for his humanist beliefs. He was originally ordained
as a priest but disliked monastic life, however it was not until 1514
that he was given a special dispensation from the Pope to formally
continue with the extra-monastic life of studying, writing, and teaching
that he lived after quitting the monastery. Initially after leaving
the monastic order he had turned to university studies of theology
in Paris, but became quickly disillusioned with the Scholastic teachings.
In 1499 he travelled to England where he befriended humanist thinkers
John Colet and Thomas More. Whilst in England he studied the classics
and the sacred literature and began his own attempt to merge Christianity
with classical thinking. In 1500 he returned to Europe and studied
Greek. His first writings show a desire to return to the original
or basic forms of Christianity which is reflected in The
Complaint of Peace, namely that Christians should be peaceful
and above all not fight one another. In 1505 he was in Italy and in
1509 he returned to England to lecture at Cambridge. In 1516 he published
a version of the Bible, a more accurate version of the vulgate, which
influenced liberal reformers but which put him in a controversial
position. Erasmus was concerned with cooperation and peace between
the dissenting protestants and the Roman Catholics in the Church and
refused to become take a stand on the side of the reformers or the
conservatives, but he maintained in his writings the need to return
to the simpler messages of Christ and his followers. At the time of writing The Complaint of Peace, Europe was besieged
by wars, and Erasmus is concerned with what he saw as the hypocritical
situation of Christians fighting Christians. The article anticipates
modern pacificist demands and its thorough, but
not absolute (i.e, pacifist), condemnation of war, the participation
of the Church in fighting, and its calls for peace between all peoples.
Erasmus's diatribe against the involvement of the Church in warfare
is aptly summarized: "what is more horrible than the fact that
the cross is honored in both camps and in both lines of battle."
[i]
Erasmus
considers war to be an unmitigated evil, which should only be turned
to as a last resort. Erasmus asserts the pacificist democratic
argument which is popular in the Age of Enlightenment and with modern
liberals that wars are not the desire of the common man. If, the implication
is, the traditional structures of power were overturned, and politics
were more democratic, wars would cease. The prince should not turn
to counsel from those who have an interest in war -arms dealers, and
the inexperienced who find war attractive, but to "older men
renowned by their mercy and benevolence."
[ii]
The source of war Erasmus finds in
the courts of the princes, but recognizes that wars are waged in the
name of God, ambition, and anger. The princes love wars, he asserts,
but the love of war is contrary to the message of Christ to love one's
enemy, to turn the other cheek, and to forgo desires of revenge. Christians
should have nothing to do with war, and all of humanity should be
united, for it is but one species. Yet ambition ruins peace, and anger
and the desire for plunder turn men to war, desires which Erasmus
thinks are heathen, or un-Christian. He comments that it is not the
young and the inexperienced who are the causes of wars, but "those
who by age, experience, and wisdom should overcome the ignorance of
the common people and the inexperience of the young."
[iii]
The desire for power is the most criminal cause
of war. The prosperity of a neighbour is nothing but envy, yet he
asserts it gives princes a sufficient excuse to wage war. Envy and
the lust for power are destructive values, Erasmus implies. They prey
on the industry of other men: "What many have gathered is wasted
by a few."
[iv]
He also considers political marriages and allegiances
to be causes of war.
[v]
Erasmus attacks the contemporary rationalizations
commonly used for justifying war, and goes on to question its relation
to human nature. Thinkers on the origins are divided into a range
of camps on the issue of whether war is a necessary institution for
humanity, reflecting somehow the needs of the body, society, or the
development of nations, or whether war is a chosen by people and in
choosing that they may be choosing wrongly or emotionally and not
rationally. Erasmus recognizes that there are a plurality of motivations
to war -desire for power, envy, greed, and so on, but he is curious
as to its metaphysical status. Warring seems to be unique to humanity,
he notes. Comparing humans with animals, beasts are quite benign in
their affairs, yet humans are apt to put thousands on the battlefield
with the aim of killing and destroying. Erasmus contends with the
instinctivist thesis that wars are the inevitable result of human
nature, i.e., the theory that it is in human nature to war. (This
theory has been recenty revisited by Konrad Lorenz (On Aggression,
1966) and Robert Ardrey (The Territorial Imperative, 1967).) If the
instinctivist thesis is true, Erasmus argues that the predisposition
to warfare must be directed to the enemies of Christianity, namely
the Turks.
[vi]
But the moral ideal should be to convert the heathen
to the ways of Christians. In this argument he anticipates William
James' "Moral Equivalent of War". James argues that the
predisposition to fight can be channeled into more benign areas than
war. His solution was to employ the youth in scouting organizations,
working in the wilderness and on public projects. We can compare this
readily with Erasmus who believes the instinct to fight can be directed
into a policy of evangalism and religious conversions. The justifications of war can be extended
to cover any pretext: "If each and every offense is a sufficient
cause for war, then who is there who has not been offended?"
(192) This open-ended policy should be rejected, yet Erasmus does
not offer a positive analysis of what does constitute a sufficient
condition for a just war. Conflicts and offenses should be referred
to the wise counsels of the law, he maintains, which attempt to ensure
peace continues, but implicit in his thinking is the premise that
if the lawful and peaceful channels of arbitration are exhausted then
war is a legitimate policy. Again, we can be justified in allocating
this premise to Erasmus, given the period of his philosophy and the
prevalent theories of just war that he may have been in contact with.
Theories in the Thomist and Scholastic traditions uphold that war
is justified only in response to an injury committed, which is usually
considered to be an act of aggression, and Erasmus's concerns reflect
this theory, for he recognizes the legitimacy of war against those
who threaten the Christian way of life or the common good. This is
explicated in references to the seemingly omnipresent threat of Turkish
expansion, yet the reference to the common good also permits an extension
of legitimate warfare to wars between Christians when one party has
committed an offence agains the common good. Erasmus then does not rule out war
absolutely. War is morally justified against those who seek war, and
perhaps we are again justified in assuming that he recognizes that
this implies those who commit acts of aggression, for he argues that
only those guilty of war should be fought against: "If war is
unavoidable, then it should be conducted in such a way that the misfortunes
resulting from it be dropped at the door of those who occasioned it."
[vii]
He recognizes that some wars are legitimate,
namely wars that threaten the existence of Christianity, or wars that
are called 'primary wars' by Veale. Primary wars are those wars between
different civilizations. Secondary wars, on the other hand, are wars
between those of similar beliefs, also commonly termed civil wars.
Erasmus is thus condemning civil wars and condoning primary wars.
But even in fighting the Turkish threat, Erasmus demands that the
Church remain aloof to the fight. Internal peace, he observes, is
more conducive to external peace with other societies, for the society
that is internally divided is vulnerable to the aggressions of outsiders
("If you wish to inspire them with fear, be at peace."
[viii]
). But, as we have noted, the reference to the support
of the common good suggests that some wars between Christians who
violate the peace are permissible. The conclusion is that the end
of war is to reestablish peace, and its means are to be directed to
dealing with those who initiated war, which, he notes, are not usually
the common peasants fighting in armies.
[ix]
There are hints as to what determines
a sufficient cause for just war in Erasmus' thoughts on the status
of territorial sovereignty. Political borders, he argues, should be
set in stone and be inviolable. This, he contends, will circumvent
any possibility of destructive treaties and alliances which change
the authoratitive political structures of a nation, and "will
terminate this constant change of empire." Consequently princes
will be more interested in ruling their own affairs and not those
of others, and societies can only prosper as a result (p.194). Any
alliances should be built on friendship and sincerity and have the
common good in mind. His analysis anticipates twentieth century thinking
as evinced in the articles of the United Nations. Political borders,
once defined, are said to represent the inviolable territory that
determines political sovereignty. A breach of an internation border
defines an act of aggression and is condemned in international law.
This reasoning is implicit in Erasmus' article. Regarding the conduct of war, Erasmus
asserts that the justification of war should not overrule any sense
of proportionality: "No one achieves what he desires if the methods
employed be evil." (193) And "certain incidents must be
overlooked, for forbearance generates forbearance." (195)
If a war is considered
to be unavoidable, Erasmus asks the authorities to pay regard to its
consequences. The profits of peace must be compared to the chaos of
war (p.198), and it must be asked whether the means justify the end
(p.199). To summarize the account of Erasmus'
theory of just war, we recognize that he places emphasis on both the
principles of jus ad bellum
and the principles of jus in
bello. His theory is not at all explicit or analytically set out,
but we can draw out the main implications. Erasmus maintains a skeptical
position on the justification of war, although he admits that some
wars are legitimate, he leaves the reader to pull out the relevant
concepts. We can attribute to Erasmus a pacficist theory, that peace
should be the value of all human endeavours, but that when others
seek to overthrow the peace, they may be justly warred against. This
principle is intimately connected with the need to consider proportionality,
that wars should remain proportional to the end of peace. In turn
this allows us to create a theory of Erasmus' thoughts on the principles
of just conduct in war. He emphatically reminds his readers of their
commonality, that all peoples of the world are of the same species,
and that, for Christians, their common beliefs should be sufficient
to demand of them peace. Although he offers no analysis of the legitimate
targets of war, he is sympathetic to the soldiers and conscripts who
have to fight what are essentially the wars of their princes. It is
right, he asserts, to wage war on those who declare war, but he offers
no solutions as to whether defenders should not target conscripts,
for instance, directly, or are legitimated in using whatever means
possible to kill or constrain the warmongering leaders. Mercy and
humanitarian considerations obviously pervade Erasmus' philosophy,
and we can surmise that he would agree to the humane treatment of
noncombantants and prisoners. [i] (p.191) [ii] (p.195) [iii] (p.189) [iv] p.189 [v] (p.194) [vi] (p.196 [vii] (p.194) [viii] p.201
[ix]
(p.194). © Dr Alexander Moseley, 1998
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